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1 Introduction
The HIV/AIDS pandemic will transform Africa as
we know it. Historically, pandemic diseases have
brought major social, economic and political
transformations in their wakes. The Black Death in
fourteenth century Europe killed about one-third
of the population, transformed labour-intensive
agricultural systems, and shattered the religious
certainties of the ‘Medieval Renaissance’, with
profound cultural and political ramifications. The
introduction of smallpox and other communicable
diseases to the Americas in the sixteenth century
decimated the indigenous populations, laying them
open to colonial subjugation. Similarly,
communicable diseases ravaged nineteenth century
Africa and set the scene for the collapse of
resistance to imperial conquest.
HIV/AIDS has its unique characteristics. In the
worst-hit countries, where adult infection rates are
20 per cent or more, it will have far-reaching
effects. But there are no known models for
anticipating what the outcomes will be. The direct
impacts of HIV/AIDS on food security, through its
effects on household demographics and poor
households’ budgets, are well understood at the
local level. Less well understood are the indirect
impacts of the pandemic at the national and
regional levels. What will the HIV/AIDS pandemic
mean for the governance, peace and security of
Africa? How will the pandemic affect future
vulnerability to famine in the continent? We do not
know. But there are some augurs:
1. Zimbabwe: The fact that a very large proportion
of the army and the ‘veterans’ are HIV-positive
may well have contributed to their ruthlessness
and their behaviour has undoubtedly aggravated
the food security crisis in that country.
2. DR Congo: The reported need for AZT by
officers in foreign armies stationed in Congo,
and the possibilities of earning the money
needed for this treatment by smuggling
minerals (whereas being retained at home on
basic pay would preclude buying life-
sustaining drugs), may have contributed to the
intractability of the conflict.
Let us pessimistically assume that these crises are
prototypes of what may afflict Africa over theIDS Bulletin Vol 33 No 4 2002
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coming two decades: AIDS-related national crises
(ARNCs). This article is written on the pessimistic
assumption that the worst may happen. There are
some encouraging signs that this will not be the
case, for example the resilience of Tanzania and
Uganda under the stresses of the AIDS epidemic in
the last decade. But it is important to examine what
the ARNC scenario might entail.
Current predictions for the progress of the
pandemic and its impact do not usually include a
governance variable. It is assumed that the
governance of affected countries will remain
unchanged, or indeed will improve under the
impact of programmes such as the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
This is an important omission that may mean that
existing models err on the side of optimism.
Consider the possibility of a major ‘external’ shock,
such as a war or the collapse of governance
structures in an African country:
1. The breakdown in health services and other
essential social services would adversely affect
HIV/AIDS programmes of all kinds.
2. Associated social and economic disruption
would be likely to increase HIV transmission.
3. The economic situation would worsen,
undermining national and household food
security.
This article suggests that such shocks may in fact
arise from the direct effects of the pandemic itself
and should not be considered ‘external’. In short,
existing models of the pandemic and its impact may
lack an important element of negative feedback.
2 Economic and social
implications of the pandemic
A major adverse impact on GNP is expected from
the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It is estimated that by
2010, the South African economy will be 22 per
cent smaller than it would have been without
HIV/AIDS, amounting to a total cost of about
US$17 billion. Because South Africa is the largest
and most dynamic economy in the continent, this
will have important knock-on implications for the
region as a whole. For other very badly-hit
countries, such as Zimbabwe and Botswana, the
impact will be comparable. In Ethiopia, the
pandemic will worsen rural food insecurity: the
symptoms may well become apparent in the next
drought. In Malawi, the contributory effects of
HIV/AIDS have already been evident in the recent
food crisis (see Devereux, in this Bulletin).
The private sector will be hard hit, and
international business will be deterred. There is no
insurance against the commercial impact of
HIV/AIDS. Investment risks will increase and
returns will decline. We can expect a decline in
foreign direct investment (FDI) and a switch of
investment to less-affected countries.
The epidemic’s impact on the rural economy may
be slow, insidious and less visible than its effect on
the governmental and industrial sectors. Rural
poverty is notoriously difficult to ascertain
properly, so that increased immiseration may pass
relatively unnoticed. The skills necessary for
farming may be evenly spread throughout the
community, so that the loss of the most
experienced and skilled farmers is less detrimental
to the agricultural economy than it would be for
the industrial economy. There may be more excess
labour available in the farming sector, and more
flexibility in labour allocation than in the formal
sector. However, these considerations should
merely caution us to be more alert to the symptoms
of the economic crisis brought about by HIV/AIDS.
We can expect problems over land tenure,
especially inheritance, and gradual decapitalisation
of the worst-hit rural areas. The effects on a poor
rural community may be similar to those brought
about by large-scale outmigration of the most able
adults, but without the mitigating factor of
remittances. It will be a slow accentuation of
existing processes of impoverishment.
Accumulated experience with household coping
strategies during times of stress helps our
understanding, but only to a limited extent.
Famines do not tend to kill the economically active,
and the decisions made during these crises are
oriented towards the future viability of the
household as a unit. By contrast, the HIV/AIDS
pandemic does directly threaten the lives of the
household decision-makers. We know much too
little about how risks are assessed, and strategies
evaluated, to have any optimism that established
models of coping will be applicable to this situation.
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It is certain that HIV/AIDS is contributing to
incidents of corruption, although we must rely on
anecdote rather than systematic investigation at
this stage. Individuals who know they are HIV-
positive will try to seek illegal sources of income,
both to pay for treatment, and to ensure that their
families are catered for when they are incapacitated
and after they have died. What happens when
these individuals are not minor bureaucrats or
middle-rank managers in the private sector, but are
government ministers, generals or the owners of
important businesses? Such people may be ready to
tolerate extreme abuses of power, or engage in
high-level corruption themselves, leading to the
effective dismantling of entire institutions, to serve
their own or their families’ interests.
Soldiers are one of the occupational categories
most afflicted by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. HIV
infection rates among soldiers are typically three
times higher than in the general population, and
are higher among the higher ranks (although there
are important exceptions, such as Senegal and
Ethiopia, where prompt action by the army high
commands have kept infection rates relatively low).
Seropositivity rates as high as 50–90 per cent are
common in army units in eastern and southern
Africa. This means that military readiness is much
reduced, as soldiers are sick or likely to fall sick.
Shortages of experienced and trained personnel,
especially in skill-intensive positions in the air
force, mechanised divisions and intelligence, will
become acute. Civilian-military relations are
adversely affected as the general population fears
that the army is spreading HIV. Spending on health
care for soldiers and their families, and on
pensions, will eat up an ever-larger proportion of
the defence budget.
AIDS mortality will have major negative
implications for the workforce, and entail a sharp
decline in education, health care, government
capacity, and industrial skills. The reduced working
life expectancy of skilled workers and professionals
implies a major increase in training costs. Overall
there will be a de-skilling of the workforce, at a time
when higher educational levels are most needed for
integration into the global economy.
HIV/AIDS will increase social sector spending and
require increased capacity. Even at reduced drug
prices, health sector expenditure will need to rise
markedly to provide for the care and treatment of
AIDS patients. Effective HIV interventions require
intensive programmes of counselling, testing,
public education, and supervision of treatment to
ensure it is effective and the chances of developing
resistance are minimised. These interventions
require technical and managerial skills and training.
There will be also be a burden of children
orphaned by AIDS. The number of these children
is 12 million and rising rapidly. Most are taken care
of by extended families – though they are acutely
vulnerable to livelihood shocks affecting their
carers – but the fact that the additional costs of
their care and education does not directly fall on
the state does not mean that we should ignore the
economic and social costs that fall on society.
3 Governance implications: AIDS-
related national crises
Just as HIV infection itself kills through other
infections, the pandemic-induced crisis manifests
itself in a range of other social, economic and political
pathologies. These are the ‘normal’ crises of
governance and conflict, but amplified or with
special characteristics. In the coming years, we will
undoubtedly witness ‘AIDS-related national crises’
(ARNCs) that combine one or more of these features.
An ARNC will not manifest itself like a meningitis
epidemic, a flood or a drought, with clearly
identifiable victims needing assistance. It will not
be a case of providing emergency care and
treatment to people living with AIDS (PLWAs) and
then turning back to the wider agendas.
ARNCs will fasten on to the weak points of
governance or socio-political relations that already
occur in a given society. If a country is at war, the
conduct of the armed forces is likely to be an area
in which the ARNC emerges. Where there are
latent social conflicts over employment, access to
services, or land ownership, these conflicts are
likely to be the focus for the ARNC. Where there is
corruption, it is likely to be amplified. Where there
is a brain drain of skilled personnel and
businesspeople, it is likely to be accelerated. In a
food insecure country, an ARNC may be first
manifest in a famine partly brought about by
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government mismanagement and market crisis.
The weakest institutions are likely to be first in line
to collapse in an ARNC.
The good news is that we have sufficient early
warning of the full-scale development of national
HIV/AIDS epidemics. We know HIV prevalence.
We can even identify the weak points of the socio-
political system that are most vulnerable to AIDS-
induced crises. The bad news is that we do not
know how to respond to ARNCs.
4 Why conventional responses to
ARNCs will not work
Each ARNC will manifest itself as a crisis of
governance, corruption, armed conflict or social
conflict – i.e. as a ‘normal’ crisis. These will elicit a
range of responses from neighbouring African
countries, regional and sub-regional organisations,
and the international community. Diplomatic
dialogue, negotiations, resolutions in international
fora, conditionalities on aid, and even sanctions,
are the standard armoury for responding to
political crises. Perhaps, as suggested above, the
crises in Zimbabwe and DR Congo are prototypes
for ARNCs.
But these normal responses may not work, and
may in some respects make the situation worse.
Those who are certain that they are going to die
may be so desperate and reckless that they are not
amenable to pressure or rational argument. More
widely, foreshortened adult life expectancy is likely
to have significant effects on decision-making,
promoting short-termism. Responses that entail
economic pressure are likely only to increase the
desperation of those driving the crisis. They will
undermine the governance capacity of the targeted
country. And the AIDS pandemic may interact with
the socio-economic crisis, each feeding on each
other and worsening the situation.
Moreover, the key decision-makers may be
unwilling to acknowledge the AIDS-related
dimension to the problem. Whether they
themselves are HIV-positive or not, they will
explain the crisis in more conventional terms, and
will use every political and propaganda strategy to
‘win’ their immediate goals. In short, ARNCs may
acquire their own ‘immunity’ to interventions.
In the coming years, special HIV/AIDS programmes
will be an integral part of every African country’s
public policy and international partnerships.
Clearly there is a powerful case for exempting
HIV/AIDS programmes (and health services in
general) from any sanctions or conditionalities, and
developing and maintaining them under all political
circumstances. But this is not as easy as it sounds
(on the related case of sanctions against Iraq, see
Gazdar, in this Bulletin). The experience of food
relief and famine in recent decades has important
lessons. Ring-fencing humanitarian assistance can
neither address the root causes of the crisis, nor
prevent mismanagement of the humanitarian
resources themselves. In the case of health and
HIV/AIDS programmes, ring-fencing them will
similarly be an absolute minimum response. In the
absence of peace, stability, education, vibrant civil
society and good governance, even the best health-
focused HIV/AIDS programmes will have only a
limited impact on the pandemic. But a Ministry of
Health is unlikely to keep its head, while all around
are losing theirs. And it is even possible that
reckless leaders of crisis-afflicted countries will raid
the Ministry of Health’s coffers to enrich themselves
or buy weapons.
Are there other, more ambitious responses possible
to a country plunged into a full-scale ARNC? Can
the extent of the political crisis, or indeed the level
of the AIDS pandemic itself, warrant extraordinary
measures such as international military
intervention? In theory, lawyers can make the
arguments. In practice, whether such extreme
measures could ever work is open to doubt. And
unfortunately, experience shows that a ruthless and
reckless national leader can defy his people’s wishes
and international public opinion for a long time,
while he leads his country to ruin. Little can be
done other than ad hoc remedial measures until the
crisis comes to its own resolution.
The inability of Africa and the international
community to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe (which
is at least a semi-ARNC) is disturbing. What if
current projections for the social and economic
impact of AIDS in South Africa prove too optimistic,
and that country becomes embroiled in an ARNC?
What if AIDS is the critical factor that destroys
Ethiopia’s already fragile governance capacity? What
happens if some young army officers who are living
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with HIV/AIDS become bitter enough to launch a
coup in any one of a dozen countries? These are
frightening scenarios that should compel us to
redouble our efforts to prevent ARNCs.
5 Implications for development
partnerships
Donor countries, notably the USA, have put the
HIV/AIDS pandemic at the head of their
development priorities for Africa. To date, this
consists largely of a focus on providing cheaper
(and hopefully more effective) drugs, strengthening
health systems, and supporting HIV-specific
education, prevention and care interventions.
These are all important. But with the possible
outbreak of ARNCs, responding to the wider socio-
economic and political demands of the ARNC-
affected countries may rise to the top of the agenda.
ARNC responses may consume very large
proportions of overseas development assistance
(ODA) budgets, leaving little for existing
development partnerships and still less for the
‘enhanced partnerships’ envisaged by the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
Responding to HIV/AIDS and ARNCs does not just
have financial implications. It also introduces a big
unknown into the nature of the aid relationship.
The current cautious enthusiasm for African-led
development partnership initiatives and for reform
of the international aid apparatus reflects, first, the
ascendancy of some like-minded left-of-centre
European political leaders such as Tony Blair and
second, political stability and good economic
management in many parts of Africa. If NEPAD is
successful, the consensus in favour of enhanced
partnerships with Africa will strengthen. But if
these conditions change for the worse, we may see
a reversion to the ad hoc aid approaches of the past.
If the analysis here is correct, then a major
governance agenda item should be preventing or
minimising ARNCs. Improved development
partnerships based on mutual accountability
require that all scenarios are openly shared in
advance. African partners should therefore be frank
about their possible ARNC scenarios, and prepare
their international partners accordingly. This will
be the best way of protecting partnerships under
the future stresses of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
6 Preventing ARNCs
We cannot prevent the HIV/AIDS pandemic exacting
a huge human and social toll over the coming
decade – we can only mitigate this disaster and its
effects. But we can prevent ARNCs. The prevention
agenda includes early warning and preparedness,
and targeted interventions aimed at specific areas in
which HIV/AIDS interacts with governance.
6.1 Early warning
There is adequate early warning of ARNCs. We do not
know precisely what the symptoms will be, but we
can anticipate many likely sources of the pathology.
1. There are good data on HIV prevalence, which
for some countries can be disaggregated by
occupational and socio-economic category, so
that we know for instance which armies and
which economic sectors are most affected.
2. Increasingly there are good models of
governance and conflict prevention (the work
of the ECA – Economic Commission for Africa
– on governance indicators is especially
relevant to this) that can identify the ‘weak
spots’ at which an ARNC is likely to arise.
3. Special HIV/AIDS-related indicators can be
added to the list of governance indicators, for
example the degree of social mobilisation of
PLWAs, the level of denial, stigma, stigma and
discrimination, and the level of openness by
the national leadership on HIV/AIDS.
4. Monitoring key aspects of the HIV/AIDS
pandemic and responses to it is becoming a
priority for international responses. As these
systems develop they will generate additional
data and analysis.
5. Utilising the available information and models,
a preliminary model of an ARNC early warning
system can be established. This should be a
priority area for institutional collaboration
within the UN system.
6.2 Preparedness
The prospect of ARNCs should shape both the
governance agenda and the HIV/AIDS programming
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agenda. It is not enough simply to do both to the
best of our ability, according to best practices for
each area separately. The interaction of HIV/AIDS
and governance creates its own dynamics and its
own priorities. We must begin to develop a special
‘HIV/AIDS governance’ agenda. Along with common
involvement in early warning for ARNCs, this might
include items such as special attention to HIV/AIDS
in the military, policies on PLWAs holding public
office, education and training, and institutional
coordination.
6.3 AIDS in the military
For a long time, this was a taboo subject, but
increasingly there is open discussion of this problem,
including sharing experiences and best practices.
HIV/AIDS in the military is belatedly achieving its
rightful place in national and international
programming. There is a pressing need for a
continent-wide working group on the subject, to:
1. share information and experiences and identify
best practices for replication in the areas of
prevention, care, treatment, civilian-military
relations and other areas;
2. examine the governance, peace and security
implications of HIV/AIDS and the military;
3. act as an advocacy forum to ensure that this
issue is prioritised in international HIV/AIDS
programming.
Demobilised soldiers and war veterans should not
be overlooked. They have legitimate demands on
public action, and may be well-mobilised and able
to take unilateral action in pursuit of their claims.
6.4 PLWAs holding public office
We need to pay special attention to a particular
subcategory of PLWAs: those holding public office
(PLWAs-HPO). These individuals are potentially
both an asset and a liability. We do not want to
force PLWAs to leave public office (or indeed any
positions of authority in the public, private or
voluntary sectors). On the contrary, their
continued engagement in their positions and their
careers is necessary and welcome. Those who are
ready to publicly admit their status can be symbols,
opinion-formers and role models. But they can also
be the lead agents in creating ARNCs. Special
policies are required for PLWAs-HPO.
1. PLWAs-HPO have different needs and interests
to their counterparts who are not living with
HIV/AIDS. Their needs for treatment and for an
income for their families are issues demanding
a public policy response. The negative
response would be dismissal. A positive
response would be provision of treatment and
care, and assistance to dependents. Ideally this
should be done without violating the principle
of equity: all PLWAs should have access to
these. Unfortunately, pragmatism may dictate
prioritisation.
2. At present, voluntary counselling and testing is
confined to dealing with the personal
implications of living with HIV/AIDS, including
especially family relationships. But for PLWAs-
HPO, the governance implications are important
too. Counselling on how to handle social and
governmental responsibilities is one element.
3. Another, less palatable element is scrutiny for
abuse of office. Ideally, all public servants should
be subject to the same high standards of scrutiny.
In reality, where oversight mechanisms are weak,
difficult choices have to be made. The national
security agenda of maintaining governance and
peace may run into conflict with the individual
public servant’s right to privacy, but this is a
conflict of interest that may have to be resolved
in favour of the public interest.
6.5 Education and training
The toll of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on Africa’s
skilled and experienced labour force is well-
documented. The toll is exacerbated by high rates
of emigration to developed countries. These two
factors may combine in a vicious spiral: just as AIDS
kills off professionals and skilled workers, the
remainder are further encouraged to leave by the
AIDS-related economic downturn and social decay.
This component of ARNC prevention demands
imaginative new forms of international partnership,
perhaps enlisting the health and education services
of developed countries as well as development
cooperation departments in training programmes.
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6.6 Institutional co-ordination
The prospect of ARNCs demands that there is
policy coordination between institutions that
normally do not need to work closely together.
Within national governments it demands
cooperation between ministries of health, finance,
defence, interior, and labour and social affairs. At
an international level it demands coordination
between institutions that deal with peace and
security and those that deal with economic
development and health. The requirement is not
merely that these parallel institutions share
information, but that the area of institutional
overlap is prioritised.
7 Conclusion: an HIV/AIDS
governance is needed
This article has sought to explore some of the wider
dimensions of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. It
has been deliberately pessimistic. Its conclusion is
that responding to HIV/AIDS should not be merely
at the head of the list of Africa’s domestic policy
agenda, and its international cooperation agenda,
but that it should strongly influence every item on
that agenda. We need, in short, a special model of
governance for the next decade: an HIV/AIDS
governance. We need to pay heed to the possibility
that several contemporary crises in Africa are
harbingers of a syndrome that will afflict the
continent over the coming years.
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